Texas Supreme Court upholds juvenile's right to counsel

In an opinion issued today, the Texas Supreme Court did something it had only ever done one time before. It talked about Miranda. The Texas Supreme Court is a civil court. It doesn't hear criminal cases. Usually. As of 2003, the State can appeal pretrial suppression orders in certain circumstances in juvenile cases. Since juvenile cases are considered civil in nature, the Supreme Court gets to hear them.

In the Matter of H.V. is a juvenile murder case dating back to September 2003, and is the first appeal to be heard by the Court under the new statute. The issues were whether the juvenile unambiguously invoked his right to counsel and whether the gun found as a result of the interrogation should be admitted. The trial court ordered both the statement and the gun suppressed. The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression.

The State sought review by the Supreme Court, and almost exactly one year ago to the day (April 12, 2007 actually) the case was argued before the Court. David Curl argued the case for the Tarrant County District Attorney's office, and the juvenile was represented by a handsome, brilliant young attorney. Me.

The Supreme Court held, rather quickly and easily actually, that the juvenile's request to speak to his mother at the beginning of the interrogation was an unambiguous request for counsel. Although there is caselaw that might indicate a request to speak to someone other than an attorney is not a request for counsel, the circumstances of this request were important.

When H.V. was arrested (for the second time) he was Mirandized by the interrogating magistrate. At this point, he told the magistrate he wanted to speak to his mother. The magistrate told him he could not do that at that time. H.V. then said he wanted his mother to get him an attorney. The magistrate then told him only he could request an attorney. H.V. then told the magistrate that he was only 16.

The Court held that under those circumstances, H.V. was not simply requesting to speak to someone else, but rather was seeking to obtain counsel. When the magistrate denied his request to speak to his mother, this was a de facto denial of his right to counsel.

As for the gun, it had been argued and held that since the gun was discovered only as a result of the illegal interrogation, it too should be suppressed under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree theory. However, in what I would consider flawed logic (and a SCOTUS opinion that is only marginally on point) the Court held that tangible evidence cannot be suppressed as a result of an illegal interrogation.

We will wait to see if the D.A.'s office seeks a rehearing in the Supreme Court or seek further review. The opinion is here.