The Matlock Blog

Texas Supreme Court upholds juvenile's right to counsel

In an opinion issued today, the Texas Supreme Court did something it had only ever done one time before. It talked about Miranda. The Texas Supreme Court is a civil court. It doesn't hear criminal cases. Usually. As of 2003, the State can appeal pretrial suppression orders in certain circumstances in juvenile cases. Since juvenile cases are considered civil in nature, the Supreme Court gets to hear them.

In the Matter of H.V. is a juvenile murder case dating back to September 2003, and is the first appeal to be heard by the Court under the new statute. The issues were whether the juvenile unambiguously invoked his right to counsel and whether the gun found as a result of the interrogation should be admitted. The trial court ordered both the statement and the gun suppressed. The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression.

The State sought review by the Supreme Court, and almost exactly one year ago to the day (April 12, 2007 actually) the case was argued before the Court. David Curl argued the case for the Tarrant County District Attorney's office, and the juvenile was represented by a handsome, brilliant young attorney. Me.

The Supreme Court held, rather quickly and easily actually, that the juvenile's request to speak to his mother at the beginning of the interrogation was an unambiguous request for counsel. Although there is caselaw that might indicate a request to speak to someone other than an attorney is not a request for counsel, the circumstances of this request were important.

When H.V. was arrested (for the second time) he was Mirandized by the interrogating magistrate. At this point, he told the magistrate he wanted to speak to his mother. The magistrate told him he could not do that at that time. H.V. then said he wanted his mother to get him an attorney. The magistrate then told him only he could request an attorney. H.V. then told the magistrate that he was only 16.

The Court held that under those circumstances, H.V. was not simply requesting to speak to someone else, but rather was seeking to obtain counsel. When the magistrate denied his request to speak to his mother, this was a de facto denial of his right to counsel.

As for the gun, it had been argued and held that since the gun was discovered only as a result of the illegal interrogation, it too should be suppressed under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree theory. However, in what I would consider flawed logic (and a SCOTUS opinion that is only marginally on point) the Court held that tangible evidence cannot be suppressed as a result of an illegal interrogation.

We will wait to see if the D.A.'s office seeks a rehearing in the Supreme Court or seek further review. The opinion is here.

Texas Supreme Court hears oral argument in rare murder case

On Thursday, April 12, the Texas Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the campus of Austin College in Sherman, Texas. This marked the first time the Court has held arguments in a location other than either the Supreme Court or a Texas law school. For the criminal practicioner, the more important aspect was the fact that one of the cases is actually a criminal case.
In re H.V. is actually a murder case arising from Tarrant County. As I posted earlier, the issues deal with suppression of evidence in the Miranda context. Specifically, whether a juvenile's request to contact his mother to obtain an attorney for him was an unambiguous request for counsel pursuant to Davis v. U.S. and whether the denial of that request violated Miranda, Edwards and a suspect's constitutional right to counsel. Additionally, there is an issue of derivative evidence. What happens to derivative evidence obtained solely from a statement when the statement is obtained in violation of a suspect's Miranda rights? The issues are not as clear as one would assume. You can hear the oral arguments here, thanks to the Supreme Court's Audio Webcast.

Texas Supreme Court to hear arguments in Juvenile Murder Case

On Thursday, April 12, the Supreme Court of Texas will hear arguments in the case of In re H.V. The H.V. case stems from a 2003 Fort Worth murder case involving a juvenile defendant. H.V. was accused of murdering a high school classmate and disposing of the body in a local construction site. After H.V. was arrested, he was interrogated by Fort Worth Police. At issue in this case is whether the 16 year-old foreign-born juvenile suspect invoked his right to counsel when, after being advised of his right to counsel, he indicated he was only sixteen and wanted to speak to his mother so that she could get him an attorney. The second issue is whether derivative evidence, in this case the gun alleged to be the murder weapon, should have been surpressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Following a day-long suppression hearing, Judge Jean Boyd of the 323rd District Court supressed the juvenile's statement to police as well as the gun found as a direct result of that statement. The Second Court of Appeals affirmed that suppression order in its original opinion, In re H.V., __ S.W.3d __, No. 02-04-00029, 2005 WL 627774. The State filed a motion for rehearing arguing the Second Court of Appeals had incorrectly concluded the derivative evidence should be supressed as a result of the violation of Miranda. The Second Court of Appeals issued a new opinion in In re H.V., 179 S.W.3d 746 (Tex.App.-- Fort Worth 2005, pet. granted) (op. on reh'g) stil affirming the trial court.
As part of the Austin College Law Symposium, the Supreme Court of Texas will hear arguments in the H.V. case. Although the Supreme Court is a civil court, in Texas juvenile law is deemed civil in nature. Consequently, all juvenile appeals, even when dealing with issues as purely criminal as federal constitutional law in this case, fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.