The Matlock Blog

My Client's a Moron, But That's Not Against the Law

Ah, yes.  One of my favorite lines from one of my favorite movies, A Few Good Men.  I have, on occasion, used this line when discussing the actions of a client.  Now, as it turns out, I can use it to discuss prosecutors.  Seriously.  Thank our good friend SCOTUS.

As Scott Greenfield over at Simple Justice brought up, SCOTUS delivered the opinion of Van de Kamp v. Goldstein.  Apparently when you're incompetent, and you're a prosecutor, you're completely immune from a §1983 suit.  Therefore, you can be a moron, but that's not against the law.

It seems that poor Goldstein was convicted and spent 24 years in a California prison because the prosecutors failed to provide the defense with Giglio material.  Specifically, the prosecutors didn't turn over the fact that the snitch who testified against him and got him convicted was a liar and was paid for his testilying ways.  Goldstein sued the prosecutors for not having a way to maintain even a semblance of competency in keeping track of which snitch was lying and which was being paid off, or both.

SCOTUS decided that it might be too burdensome to ensure the government didn't screw the proverbial pooch.  I mean, after all, county employees should be able to say "My bad" when it comes to administrative screw-ups.  Hell, so would I.  The problem is, when I screw up that badly, there's actually a term for it.  It's called Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.  Or contempt.  As in, "Mr. Matlock, you weren't in court as scheduled, I hold you in contempt."

But what the hell do I know?

Justice Department looks to end Detainee Cases

Today, the Justice Department moved the District Court judges in D.C. to dismiss approximately 185 pending cases involving Guantanamo Bay detainees. These cases are challenging the continued confinement of the defendants and their legal status. The motion (found here) seeks to enforce the Circuit's February 20 ruling that no court may consider any habeas challenge by any foreign national captured in the "war on terrorism."

On April 2, SCOTUS refused to review the Circuit Court's decision. This has left open the opportunity for the courts to issue the mandate that would put the ruling into effect. However, attorneys for the Gitmo detainees have recently asked the D.C. Circuit to hold off on that action in an effort to seek other avenues of legal action, presumably including an attempted return trip to SCOTUS. The Circuit Court has yet to rule on that request.

The motion by DOJ argues that in light of the February 20 ruling, "the law of this Circuit is settled." A citation in a footnote of that motion is to a concurring opinion of a D.C. Circuit opinion from 1990, Ayuda Inc. v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 153, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1990), which the DOJ argues "once an opinion is released it becomes the law of this circuit". The motion also argues in support that the D.C. Circuit has dismissed other cases since the ruling, specifically on March 22 and April 9. Because in the DOJ's mind the law of the circuit is now settled, the "federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over cases brought by aliens at Guantanamo Bay detained as enemy combatants or awaiting determination of their status, and such aliens do not have constitutional rights."

In light of possible concerns regarding attorney access to detainees, the DOJ's motion sougth to assure the courts that access will still be granted. This is important with the transition of the cases from the District Courts to the D.C. Circuit under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 for the review of the military's confinement decisions. According to DOJ, attorneys can file simple papers in the Circuit to engage the review process of the Act.

The dismissal motion was filed in cases involving detainees, as well as those who have been sent to other countries, released or previously determined not to be "enemy combatants." SCOTUS is set to consider whether to hear the appeal of Hamdan/ Kadr v. Bush, 06-1169 at its April 27 conference.

Supreme Court rules Statute of Limitations for AEDPA not tolled by Petition for Certiorari

Gary Lawrence was convicted by a Florida jury of premeditated murder in the first degree and conspiracy to commit murder. He was sentenced to death. Lawrence appealed his conviction through the Florida appellate system and ultimately petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The petition was denied. Lawrence subsequently filed an application in state court for postconviction relief 364 days after the Supreme Court denied his original petition. The Florida trial court denied his request and that decision was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. The United States Supreme denied his petition for review. At the time that petition was pending, he filed a federal habeas petition. The United States District Court and the Eleventh Circuit both denied the habeas relief on the basis that the request was untimely in light of the statute of limitations restrictions. Section 2244(d)(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a one year statute of limitations for such habeas relief.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court held the one year statute of limitations in Section 2244(d)(2) of AEDPA was not tolled by the Petitioner's pending petition of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, explains that the petition is not a statutory tolling event because the only tolling occurs during the state court review, and the Supreme Court review is not deemed state court review. Additionally, the Court concluded that the Petitioner's circumstances did not warrant equitable tolling as his situation did not constitute extraordinary circumstances.